For Putin’s Kremlin, There Is No Cavalry Coming over the Hill

Even though Wagner Group boss Evgeny Prigozhin’s mutinous march on Moscow ended as suddenly as it began, the episode laid bare the unfavorable environment in which Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin finds itself. However, Prigozhin’s actions by no means doomed Putin’s state to imminent failure, and itself was poorly equipped to effect change in a meaningful way.

Prigozhin’s mutiny showed that Putin’s state is brittle in its form and ability to respond to crises. While tangible differences among Russia’s elite class have fed disputes since the first months of Russia’s Ukraine invasion, none appeared to have crossed into the realm of outright revolt until Wagner’s June 2023 mutiny. Though Prigozhin may have unsuccessfully banked on the support of certain regional elites or well as a subset of, that same system of civil and military elites either chose not (or lacked the ability) to leap to the defense of the Kremlin. Whether he was involved in the mutiny or not, the reported possibility that a high-ranking military official such as General Sergei Surovikin had foreknowledge of the Wagner putsch underlines how much the Kremlin itself may have been caught off guard by the event.

As military leaders mostly stood by as Wagner captured the city of Rostov-on-Don and advanced on Moscow, civilian leaders either offered rhetorical condemnations of the mutiny or simply remained silent on the matter as it played out. This dynamic of elite waffling could be a complicating factor for the Kremlin as it lays the foundation for the choreography surrounding the Russian 2024 presidential election.

Despite Belarusian leader Alexandr Lukashenko’s mediation of an agreement between Prigozhin and the Kremlin which halted Wagner’s march on Moscow, the mutiny also underlined how Russia’s leadership cannot rely on outside help in moments of peril. While a Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) force swept in to Kazakhstan a year and a half ago to save the embattled government of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, no such aid was forthcoming for Russia’s leadership. While it has not officially requested aid from CSTO for its war in Ukraine or this past month’s crisis, it is unlikely that any assistance would have been dispatched by other members of an alliance whose cohesion has suffered tremendously if such a request had been made as a series of regional disturbances following have reduced its cohesion. The mutiny could also be reason for pause in Beijing, who will now have good reason to doubt the staying power of its most significant partner for future competition with the US.

However, the eventual outcome of the mutiny was far from a worst-case scenario for the Kremlin. The overall passive approach of Russia’s elite to this crisis can be interpreted a sign of regime fragility, but it can also be seen as indication that Russia’s elite is not necessarily eager to replace Putin in the short-term future, too. While Prigozhin and Wagner’s future in Belarus remains uncertain (with the mercenary group reportedly continuing, then temporarily ceasing, direct recruitment into its ranks following the mutiny), the main challenge to the defense ministry’s authority appears to be sidelined for now.

Notwithstanding the considerable apprehension which a mutiny like Prigozhin’s in a nuclear power such as Russia’s naturally engenders, the deal struck by Putin and Prigozhin has prevented the emergence of wider power struggle within Russia. Prigozhin and Russia’s leadership can look to the case of Sudan’s ongoing internal conflict as a cautionary tale. In Sudan, the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (which was resistant to attempts to rapidly fold it into the Sudanese Armed Forces, similar to Wagner’s pre-mutiny refusal of direct integration into the Russian Defense Ministry) chose to press forward and continue fighting the central government of General al-Burhan, sparking open fighting across the country which is yet to be resolved. In a more positive direction for him, President Putin can look to the example of his “dear friend” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, who weathered a 2016 military coup attempt and used the opportunity to consolidate power in his hands. In his declaration following the mutiny’s end that Russian society and institutions had rallied around the flag in a moment of need, Putin clearly seeks to depict a story of post-putsch regime consolidation.

It is important to observe that the fallout of Prigozhin’s mutiny is far from settled. Even if future events clarify that June’s episode was a failed final stand of Prigozhin and Wagner, individual players inside the Russian system (and potentially “outside,” in the case of Lukashenko) could see their careers boosted in return for their role in bringing the mutiny to an end. What is clear, though, is that this revolt has triggered a rebalancing of the internal balance of power within the Russian state, the complete effects of which are yet to be seen.