Op-Ed

Explaining Trump’s Foreign Policy

By Michael Rubin

Commentary

May 02, 2017

Over one hundred days into Donald Trump’s administration, in what direction has his foreign policy developed? My American Enterprise Colleague Danielle Pletka argued in the Washington Post that Trump has become “a normal president.”

But 100 days into his term, President Trump has been far more conventional than many dared hope. Many of his promises, from labeling China a currency manipulator to staying out of Syria to making nice with Russia, appear to be on hold — which should surprise no one. Consider each recent president and contrast the candidate with the man in office: George H.W. Bush promised a more “realist” global posture than Ronald Reagan but ended up proclaiming a “new world order.” Bill Clinton rejected that, insisting it was “the economy, stupid,” but ended his tenure with his secretary of state arguing that the United States is “the indispensable power.” George W. Bush promised a more “humble” presidency but after 9/11 invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, inaugurating a far-from-humble “freedom agenda” to promote democracy in the Middle East. Barack Obama promised to “end this war” in Iraq and wrap up the conflict with the Taliban, but joined NATO in invading Libya, recommitted troops to Iraq after withdrawing them, continued the war in Afghanistan and sent Special Operations forces and others to Syria and Yemen. In short, the foreign policy promises of presidential candidates are rarely gospel. The world has a way of upending even the best-laid campaign platforms.

Is Trump, however, just a manager, reacting to events rather than proactively placing his own philosophical stamp upon them? Clearly, that is not the case: He may have deferred action of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Paris Climate Agreement, but he did kill the Trans-Pacific Partnership and, while his wall remains unfunded and unbuilt, he has changed the permissive attitude toward illegal immigration that predominated under his predecessors.

If there is a philosophical stamp when it comes to foreign policy, then, what is it? Trump rhetoric is often as contradictory as his actions and labels are not easy. After all, Trump has declared himself both “a nationalist and a globalist.”

Last month, the New York Times speculated that Trump’s views—or at least those of his aide Stephen Bannon—were shaped by The Fourth Turning, a 1997 book that argued that there are 80-year cycles of prosperity and catastrophe. The New York Times explained:

The book delineates history into four seasonal cycles, or “turnings”: growth, maturation, decay, and destruction. It is the kind of wild, provocative idea that Mr. Bannon loves. But it is also just the kind of thinking that his opponents see as evidence that he is too Machiavellian and idiosyncratic for the job of President Trump’s chief strategist.

The basis of his worldview—which has been described as everything from Leninist to alt-right, an extremist fringe movement associated with white nationalism—is still shrouded in mystery and conjecture. But by his own telling, much of the foundation for his political beliefs can be found in the book, which predicts that America is hurtling toward a crisis on par with the American Revolution, the Civil War, and the Great Depression. And the grim future that the book foresees helps explain the underpinnings of the president’s conservative, nationalist “America First” agenda, one that Mr. Bannon has played a large role in shaping.

Put aside the snark—Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah, a fourteenth-century masterpiece that is part of the canon Middle Eastern historians read—likewise articulates natural cycles of history. The questions are first whether Bannon really shapes Trump’s vision and whether The Fourth Turning really explains Trump’s policy.

Unmentioned by the New York Times and probably unread by either Trump or Bannon is another book that seems to fit Trump’s thinking. In 2011, anthropologist and Naval Postgraduate School professor Anna Simons coauthored The Sovereignty Solution with Joe McGraw and Duane Lauchengco, two U.S. Special Forces officers. Their goal was to outline a U.S. foreign policy that would ensure order and security in the world without overextending the U.S. military in far-flung policing and nation-building exercises.

They emphasize the importance of sovereignty and accountability in international relations. If a Belgian conducts a terrorist attack against Americans, the government of Belgium would likely assist the United States in bringing that suspect to justice. Washington should demand no less of Iran or Saudi Arabia and would only act when those governments do not undertake the responsibility of their own sovereignty. Gone, however, is the notion of democratization or transformational diplomacy: It is not for the United States to tell Turkey, Russia, or the Philippines, how to act.

Whatever one thinks of such recommendations, but they are born honestly out of the experience of those who have seen combat first hand and the failures of over-extension. Their prescriptions go beyond traditional debates of neoconservatism, liberal internationalism, or realism.

There may be much to agree or disagree with in The Sovereignty Solution, but it is perhaps the best book out there to act as a framework for the Trumpian worldview. Sometimes, there is order in seeming chaos.