Op-Ed

U.S. Naval Promises Still Matter to Abu Dhabi​

By Clara Keuss

Center for Maritime Strategy

August 08, 2023

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of the United States’ principal allies in the Middle East. And for good reason: The Emirati military is one of the few capable forces in the region. They have fought ISIS and Al Qaeda alongside U.S. and coalition soldiers in Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia-Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. However, the Emirates believe that, in return for that strategic loyalty, Washington has turned its back on them. Multiple Iranian attacks on shipping in Gulf waters have exposed an ongoing security threat, one that Abu Dhabi has accused the U.S. of ignoring. Once lost, the trust underpinning this critical alliance will be hard to regain.

It was not always so. In recognition of their special relationship, the two countries signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement (“DCA”) in 2019. This served as a capstone acknowledgment of UAE support for U.S. military campaigns and demonstrated the U.S.’ ongoing commitment to the partnership. So close was the U.S.-UAE relationship that Abu Dhabi was the first to accept the U.S.’ new vision for the region: the Abraham Accords. But what many signatories to the Abraham Accords failed to understand was that new vision was actually a fond farewell, a hand-off to Israel of the previous U.S. defense umbrella intended to facilitate the Obama-era “pivot to Asia.”

Asia experts will insist that the pivot has been less of a turn towards Beijing and more a turn away from the Middle East. Troop drawdowns in Iraq and the withdrawal from Afghanistan did not lead to a meaningful repositioning of hard power in the Indo-Pacific. In President Biden’s State of the Union Address, the Middle East was not mentioned once.

Yet, per Pentagon calculations, Iran has harassed, attacked, or interfered with nearly 20 internationally flagged merchant ships since 2021 alone. Many of these seizures occur in the Strait of Hormuz, bordering the UAE, causing UAE officials to complain that its waters are becoming unsafe to navigate. On July 5th, 2023, Iran tried to seize two commercial tankers – one of which was making its way from the UAE to Singapore. The U.S. Navy responds to these instances with just enough deterrence to prevent the isolated seizures to escalate (threatening rhetoricrearranging ships, even sending fighter jets) but not enough to staunch the multiplication of the seizures themselves, by the Biden Administration’s directive.

The UAE is disenchanted with U.S. security guarantees. Two months ago, the Emirati government pulled representatives from the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) headquarters in Bahrain, where the U.S. Fifth Fleet resides. Though they described their participation in the coalition as “on-hold,” the statement from their foreign ministry cited an “ongoing evaluation of effective security cooperation with all partners.” Soon after, Emirati President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed pulled President Biden aside at a summit and expressed frustration with the U.S. for abandoning its security guarantees.

Unsurprisingly, Iranian media has jumped at the prospect of wooing erstwhile U.S. allies. Iranian naval commander Shahram Irani announced that an Iran-led naval coalition is in the works, including the UAE, other Gulf states, India, and Pakistan. The Tehran Times expressed hope for regional cooperation given the “wind of de-escalation that is currently blowing across the region.”

China has a different approach. In 2021, the Biden Administration barely deterred Beijing from finishing construction on a military facility at a port in the UAE. The occasion was so serious that U.S.-UAE relations were threatened until construction was halted. Russia also has influence, as the war in Ukraine has made the UAE a wartime harbor for expats. Recently, on July 12, 2023, Moscow even backed the UAE in an island dispute – against Iran. Russia and China are signaling clearly: they are on the Emirati’s side. And not only that, but they present alternatives to Western leadership in facing Iran. Is it any wonder that the UAE is diversifying its military suppliers away from the United States?

What is to be done? The Senate’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) – this year’s defense authorization bill, yet to be passed – offers one solution. It includes the Maritime Architecture and Response to International Terrorism in the Middle East, (MARITIME) Act, bipartisan legislation introduced initially by the House Abraham Accords Caucus. The legislation “directs a strategy for improved maritime domain awareness and interdiction capabilities to counter seaborne threats in the Middle East.” It would perhaps materialize what has been, until now, merely “Kabuki theater” between Iran and the U.S. It would send a strong and serious signal to the UAE that U.S. security promises are not just talk.

It is a start, and possibly a very good one. The UAE was satisfied with U.S. engagement at the level it has been for nearly 30 years; it is now a matter of maintaining that support. Otherwise, the UAE will be courted by those who have not lost interest – including Tehran, Beijing, and Moscow – and the U.S. will watch a longtime ally slip away.